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The courts will conclusively presume that the head of the department acted
on the testimony submitted to him as fully as if he had been present at the
hearing and had not submitted it to one of his assistants."1 8
Thus, the administrative procedure employed by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture in the Morgan case insofar as it relates to the delegation of power "to
hear" should have been upheld. The Supreme Court, however, denies the
validity of the order on this and two other grounds; if what the Court says
is true, namely, "what the statute requires 'relates to substance and not form',"
these grounds for reversal are equally untenable. One of these is that the
Secretary conferred with members of his staff who were familiar with the
evidence. The Court recognizes that evidence may be sifted and analyzed
by competent subordinates and it would seem that it would make no difference
whether this analysis comes to the Secretary in oral or written form. The
other ground is that the plaintiff was not advised of the claims of the govern-
ment. But the previous order was before him and was part of the record, and
this order certainly informed Morgan of the nature of the claims and issues
involved.
In conclusion, it may be noted that the effect of the decision in the Morgan
case may vary to a great extent the procedural methods employed by adminis-
trative agencies. However, in view of the decisions heretofore presented, it
would appear that the immediate effect of the decision would be limited to the
Department of Agriculture unless recent objections to administrative action
cause the court to limit further the governmental agencies. As it now stands,
the Secretary may authorize a subordinate to hear the evidence, but he must
hear at least the oral argument of the defendant in order to validate an
order which he issues. H. M. K.
APPEAL AND ERROR-JURY TRIAL-POWER OF APPELLATE COURT TO REVERSE
AND ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT WITHOUT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL.-Plaintiff
brought action to recover $1,840 allegedly due on a lease contract as back rent
and reconditioning expenses. Defendant answered in general denial and
affirmatively pleaded oral modification of the lease and admitted liability for
$300, which amount was tendered into court. No motion was made for a
directed verdict; the jury found for defendant, and judgment was entered by
the trial court against the plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
16 Cases concerning the Post Office Department are not the only ones which
have upheld the complete delegation of conducting hearings to subordinates.
De Cambra v. Rogers (1903), 189 U. S. 119, 23 S. Ct. 519 (Orders issued by
the Secretary of Interior conclusively presumed to be valid even though all
the Secretary did was to sign the order.) Immigration cases, relating to both
exclusion (Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson (1927), 273 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 346)
and deportation (Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration (1927), 273 U. S.
103, 47 S. Ct. 302), have declared valid orders issued by the Secretary of
Labor when all he had was a report from an extra-legal Board of Review.
In United States v. Standard Oil Company of California (1937), 20 F. Supp.
427, the court distinguishes the first Morgan case on the basis that the instant
case was one dealing with appellate review, but it makes this statement,
"Executive officers may rely on the assistance of others. Even where the duty
'to hear' in the first instance is imposed upon the head of a department, the
evidence may be heard by others. And the conclusion will none the less be that
of the head of the department, provided he adopts it as his own."
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judgment was reversed with direction to enter judgment for plaintiff in the
amount of $300. A judgment contrary to law may be reversed without
remanding for a new trial where further litigation is unnecessary and un-
warranted. Lesh v. Johnson Furniture Co. (Ind. 1938), 14 N. E. (2d) 537.
Entry of judgment contrary to jury verdict immediately raises the question
of the extent and limitations of the right to trial by jury. In the process of
judicial construction of this constitutional guarantee the status of judgments
non obstante 'verdicto has undergone complete metamorphosis in federal courts.
Originally at common law such a judgment was available in trial courts only
on application of the plaintiff,1 but this was later extended to allow either
the plaintiff or defendant to make the necessary motion2 though it could not
be granted merely because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 3
In contrast, many states by statute allowed not trial courts alone, but, also,
appellate courts to grant judgments non obstante verdicto where the verdict
was found unsupported by the evidence. 4 This practice of state courts was
then followed in federal courts of appeal for a time,5 but the landmark
Slocum case 6 held that the rendering of final judgment contrary to a verdict
of the jury violated the Seventh Amendment even though done in accordance
with state statute. In line with this much criticized decision7 the federal courts
consistently held that even where a directed verdict should have been ordered
on the basis of insufficient evidence to warrant submission to a jury they could
on appeal only remand for a new trial.8
The next step was again resort to state practice; the federal trial courts
assumed the power to enter judgments non obstante uerdicto by taking verdicts
subject to reserved questions of law, "with the assent of the jury" to enter
different judgment if necessary.9 Appellate courts were in consequence of the
trial court's reservations enabled to reverse without remanding for a new trial.
The Supreme Court, though occasion presented itself, refused to rebuke this
1 German Insurance Co. v. Frederick (1893), 58 F. 144.
2 United States v. Gardner (1904), 133 F. 285.
3Perkins v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (1912), 199 F. 712. Originally the
motion raised only the question of the sufficiency of the pleadings to support
the verdict, but was later extended to permit defective pleadings to be cured
by the evidence.
4 Mass. G. L. Ch. 23, Sec. 130. Also, see Bothwell v. Boston Elevated
Railway (1913), 215 Mass. 467, 102 N. E. 665.
5 Smith v. Jones (1910), 181 F. 819.
6 Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. (1913), 228 U. S. 364, 33 S. Ct.
523, 57 L. Ed. 879. The Supreme Court here held by a margin of five to
four that on reversal, if issues of fact are involved, there must be a new trial
even though the verdict must be directed in the new trial.
7Thorndyke, "Trial By Jury in the U. S. Courts," (1913), 26 Harvard
L. Rev. 732. "The declaration of a majority of the Court is a public misfortune,
because it destroys a simple means of enforcing without the expense, delay
and uncertainty of a new trial, a right to which the decision shows that a
party was entitled at the trial."
8 Young v. Central Ry. Co. (1914), 232 U. S. 602, 34 S. Ct. 451, 58 L. Ed. 750.
9 Page v. United Fruit Co. (1925), 3 F. (2d) 747. Under statute cited in
note 4 above the federal court here followed the practice of instructing on
motion for a directed verdict that the jury must return an alternative verdict
upon which the District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals, or the Supreme
Court might enter judgment if it later ruled the evidence insufficient as a
matter of law.
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practice.'o In the Redman case 1 1 the Court finally explicitly recognized an
exception to the Slocum decision by permitting federal appellate courts, in
states adopting by statute or judicial approval the practice of reserving rulings
on motions for directed verdicts, to reverse and render judgment on the
merits, rather than remand for a new trial. Under Congressional grant of
authority' 2 the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedurel8 extend the doctrine
of the Redman case and provide for reserved rulings on motions for directed
verdicts, thus making available to all federal courts, irrespective of state
practice, procedure for judgments non obstante qerdicto.
As compared with federal practice, the state courts have been more- liberal
in permitting appellate courts to reverse without remanding for a new trial.
By statutory change of the common law under which the courts could only
affirm or reverse, many states extend the power to enter final judgment on
appeal. This relieves court congestion and puts an end to litigation without
unconstitutional denial of jury trial.14  The North Dakota statute, strictly
construed by its courts, allows the appellate courts to make findings of fact,
but not where the case was tried by a jury or where a jury, though waived,
might rightfully have been claimed.1 5 Alabama enlarges the scope of the
appellate courts' power by allowing them to make findings and enter judgment
in any case where there was in fact no jury,16 even in criminal cases, 1 7 but
rendition of judgment is discretionary with the courts.1 8  Inspired by the
example of England which gives appeal courts full discretionary power to
receive evidence on questions of fact and to draw inferences preceding final
judgment thereon,' 9 California by constitutional amendment and statute has
accorded appellate courts the discretionary power to take additional evidence
prior to final judgment.20
Even though not expressly provided in the various statutes that cases tried
to a jury are not included, it is universally held that if findings of fact were
made by a jury the constitutional jury safeguards prohibit the appellate court
10 Northern Ry. Co. v. Page (1927), 274 U. S. 65, 47 S. Ct. 491, 71 L. Ed. 929.
11 Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman (1935), 295 U. S. 654-, 55 S. Ct. 890.
1228 U. S. C. A., Sec. 723 (b).
18Rule 50 (b). Reservation of Decision on Motion. "Whenever a motion
for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for
any reason not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion." See Gavit, "New Federal Rules and Indiana Procedure," 13 Indiana
L. JI. 343.
14 Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Railway (1913), 215 Mass. 467, 102
N. E. 665.
15Baird v. Abraham (1927), 55 N. D. 348, 213 N. W. 733; N. D. Comp.
Laws (Supp. 1926), Sec. 7846.
16 Cochran v. Leonard (1920), 204 Ala. 163, 85 So. 693; Ala. Code (1928)
Sec. 9502.
17 Corcoran v. State (1921), 18 Ala. App. 202, 89 So. 835.
18 Ex parte Kemp (1919), 203 Ala. 467, 83 So. 485.
19 Winterbotham & Co. v. Sibthorp (1918), 1 K. B. 625. Held, appellate
court may make its own findings, and give final judgment, although a jury
made findings in the trial court.
20 Cal. Const. Art. VI, Sec. 4Y4 ; Cal. Code Clv. Proc., Sec. 956a. See
Tupman v. Haberkern (1929), 78 Cal. Dec. 409, 280 P. 970 and note in 3
Southern California L. R. 351, for statutory construction indicating the limits
of powers of appellate courts to make findings and reverse on appeal.
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from substitution of its own findings on appeal. 2 1 Thus protraction of equity
cases may be prevented with or without statutory authority to make independent
findings of fact on appeal as a basis for final judgment; in some states this
has been extended to actions at law.2 2 But when state constitutions guarantee
the right of jury trial it is essential that such procedure be restricted to cases
where the jury was waived or the trial court was authorized to direct a
verdict.2 3
Indiana has provided for weighing evidence on appeal, 24 but exclusion
of cases "triable to a jury" from operation of the statute is held to make the
provision applicable to equity suits only.2 5 Under further practice statutes,20
without violation of the jury trial guarantee, the Indiana courts have per-
mitted reversal without remanding for new trial when all the facts necessary
to a complete and final determination of the cause are in the record either
upon special findings, 2 7 agreed statement,2 8 documentary evidence,2 9 or by
answers to interrogatories submitted to the jury,S0 where justice does not
require a new trial.
The decision of the Court in the instant case is entirely in accord with the
spirit of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It should be the policy of
the law to end litigation, but with justice for all litigants. The substance of
a trial by jury consists in the determination of issues of fact raised by com-
petent evidence produced in support of the allegations only where the jury
might reasonably find for the party who produced that evidence. There is no
denil of the right of jury trial where the court is entitled to direct a verdict
on the failure of the litigant to produce sufficient evidence to raise and support
a material issue of fact. Nor is there such a denial where the Court has
reversed only to the extent of the liability admitted by the pleadings. It is
useless multiplication of judicial work to remand for a new trial where the
trial court had failed to direct a verdict which should have been directed.
J. W. C.
BILLS AND NOTES--PRESENTMENT OF A DOMICILED NOTE-PAYMENT TO ONE
OTHER THAN THE HOLDER AS CONSTITUTING DIscHARGE-Defendant company
2 1 Mirich v. T. J. Forschner Contracting Co. (1924), 312 II. 343, 143
N. E. 846.
2 2 Donohue v. Conley (1927), 85 Cal. App. 15, 258 P. 985; In Hebert v.
New Orleans Public Service (1929), 10 La. App. 341, 119"So. 575, the Louisiana
court held that it is the appellate court's duty to render such judgment as,
in its opinion, should have been rendered by the court in the first instance,
whether the case turns upon an issue of fact or of law.
23 See note 21.
24 1933 Burns 2-3229.
25 Mills v. Thomas (1924), 194 Ind. 648, 144 N. E. 412. See note in 1933
Burns 2-2502; 2-2503; 2-3234. 8 Indiana L. J1. 195, concerning the inherent
power of appellate courts to make final disposition of equitable actions.
27Bedford Quarries Co. v. Thomas (1902), 29 Ind. App. 85, 63 N. E. 880.
28 Haskell & Barbour Car Co. v. Prezezdziankowski (1908), 170 Ind. 1, 83
N. E. 626. In Sherrod v. Lawrenceburg School City (Ind., 1938), 12 N. E.
(2d) 944, the Supreme Court reversed judgment for $648, with instructions
to enter judgment for appellant for $855, and costs, the facts not being in
dispute.
29 G. W. Conwell Bank v. Kessler (1932), 94 Ind. App. 256, 180 N. E. 625.
80 Catterson v. Hall (1906), 37 Ind. App. 341, 76 N. E. 889.
